Interpreting the Treaty of Waitangi: The Maori Resurgence and Race Relations in New Zealand by Ward, Alan
Interpreting the Treaty of Waitangi:
The Maori Resurgence and Race Relations
in New Zealand
Alan Ward
The Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 by the first British governor and
some five hundred Maori chiefs, has recently provided the basis for a wide
range of radical, but by no means new, demands. Labour governments
since 1975 have given the treaty greatly increased statutory recognition,
seeing it as a sure foundation of racial partnership and harmony. The
superior courts have carried that recognition further than many Labour
politicians would have wished. Yet the most radical Maori activists assert
that the Maori-language version of the treaty, the version their ancestors
signed, has still not been-implemented. On 6 February 1990, atWaitangi,
the sesquicentennial commemoration of the treaty was again the scene of
vociferous and now familiar protest, this time in the presence of Queen
Elizabeth II. The unusual occurrences included the hurling of a T-shirt at
the Queen by a protester who evaded the security screen and, more impor-
tant, a declamation by one of the formal speakers, the Anglican Maori
Bishop of Aotearoa. "You have marginalised us," Bishop Vercoe told Her
Majesty, and demanded that the treaty be honored (NZH, 7 Feb 1990).
Just what is meant by honoring the treaty is a matter of the greatest
concern to New Zealanders of both races. The treaty and its application
are in the news almost every day and the subject of constant discussion in
schools, universities, private and government organizations, and count-
less homes. Amid fears of deepening racial division, even the threat of vio-
lence, many Pakeha (white New Zealanders) blame the Labour govern-
ment and its careless legislation for unleashing Maori demands that are
unrealizable and will result in increased bitterness. But a survey of the ori-
gins of the treaty and the Maori view of its importance will reveal that the
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Maori demands are of long standing. Labour's attempt to meet them, in
the face of Maori demographic upsurge and strength of protest, is by no
means totally wrongheaded. The great question is whether there is enough
common ground between Maori and Pakeha for the attempt to succeed.
THE TREATY AND ITS ORIGINS
The Treaty of Waitangi was one of a long sequence of treaties the British
made with indigenous authorities to regulate matters where British
nationals had already extended their influence and were about to increase
it (McHugh 1987, II-63). A crucial point of decision for the British
authorities was whether the local authority was able to exercise effective
control in its territory and enforce law sufficiently to protect the legitimate
interests of foreign nationals as well as its own subjects. If this were so, the
British tended to recognize the local sovereignty and work through it; oth-
erwise (though often reluctantly because of the known difficulty and cost
of government), they acquired sovereignty themselves and frequently
cOlll1kd theiLtre~tjes with_all exercise oJ force.!Dallcases, the _key iss1.!e
was the status of the land rights both of the indigenous people and of the
settlers.
Following the foundation of the British colony in New South Wales
(NSW) in 1788, British subjects increasingly visited NewZealand or formed
small settlements there to kill whales and seals, to cut timber, to dress
flax, and, from 1814, to convert the Maori to Christianity. The British at
first appointed some missionaries and some Maori chiefs as justices of the
peace with authority (theoretically) to fine British subjects or arraign them
before NSW courts. British statutes of 1817, 1824, and 1828 sought to
strengthen the jurisdiction of these courts over offenses by British subjects
in New Zealand. In the 1830s, British warships made periodic visits to
enforce a crude gunboat justice. In 1831, some northern chiefs, at the mis-
sionaries' suggestion, petitioned for the protection of the British flag
against a supposed French threat. The outcome was the appointment of
James Busby, a member of a prominent NSW family, as British Resident at
Waitangi in the Bay of Islands (map 1), though without any supporting
force or even a magistrate's commission (Tapp 1958; Adams 1977).
All of these arrangements expressly recognized New Zealand as not
being among the British possessions. This was not quite the same as recog-
nizing Maori sovereignty-a recognition increasingly confined to authori-
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ties capable not only of issuing edicts but of regularly enforcing them. The
Maori were in fact perceived somewhat ambivalently. Chiefly authority
and status were clearly discernible, as elsewhere in Polynesia, but Maori
society nevertheless was turbulent and warring. It was hoped that mis-
sionary influence would lead to more orderly and regular government. On
the basis that the Maori were "semicivilized," Busby was instructed to
organize the northern tribes into some form of settled legislature, execu-
tive, and judiciary (Ward 1974, 24).
Busby had little success. But partly to provide a national flag and regis-
ter for small ships then being built in the harbors and estuaries of northern
New Zealand, he proposed that the local chiefs petition the British king
for a flag and for its recognition. The NSW governor agreed, and in 1834 a
meeting of chiefs, amid some confusion and dissatisfaction, chose a flag
from a selection of three designed in Sydney; the flag was duly gazetted,
and the Admiralty directed its vessels to honor it (Orange 1987, 20). The
following year, in response to the attempt of a French adventurer, de
Thierry, to establish a sovereign state over land he had allegedly pur-
s:haJiecl~tHQkianga,!3~Qy_p_ers!1_aA~_clJhArty-f~ur ~h!~fs_t~§Lg!1.~~~De~l~-_
ration of Independence" (He Wakaputanga 0 te Rangatiratanga 0 Nu
Tireni) and a request to King William IV to protect the infant "Confedera-
tion of the United Tribes of New Zealand" (Orange 1987, 21). The decla-
ration and request were duly acknowledged by the Colonial Office, and
though the confederation never formally assembled-indeed, the chiefs
fell to intertribal warfare-Busby continued to collect signatures from
eminent chiefs to the declaration of independence.
In 1837 a series of events caused the Colonial Office to resolve on a fur-
ther extension of British authority. In England, the New Zealand Associa-
tion of Edward Gibbon Wakefield proposed the formal colonization of
New Zealand. NSW entrepreneurs trading in New Zealand had, from time
to time, secured deeds of sale from Maori chiefs in respect of large areas of
land; from 1837, they greatly increased their activity, laying claim to much
of the Northland peninsula and to huge areas of the South Island. In 1837
also, tribal warfare convinced Busby and the missionaries that the Maori
would never be amenable to their influence without the backing of an
armed force, capable of enforcing law. In December 1837, the British gov-
ernment decided to secure sovereignty over parts of New Zealand likely to
be settled; a colonization "organised and salutary" was deemed preferable
to one that was "desultory, without Law." By August 1839, when Captain
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William Hobson was finally sent forth to establish the new colony, Wake-
field's ships had already sailed for the Cook Strait area, and Hobson was
authorized to seek the sovereignty of "the whole or any part" of New
Zealand (Ward 1974, 30-31).
In drafting Hobson's instructions, James Stephen, permanent under
secretary in the Colonial Office, reflected on the relationship between sov-
ereignty and title to land in a tribal, prestate society. Basically, Stephen
doubted that a distinction could be made between them; a tribe's or a
chief's control of land amounted to a form of local sovereignty, and
(unlike the situation in a nation-state) there was no larger, supratribal
authority in which sovereignty could be vested. Given the extent of land
selling believed to have gone on in New Zealand, the chiefs, thought
Stephens, had thereby largely divested themselves of such sovereignty as
they had possessed, and "it may be questioned whether strictly speaking
the necessity exists for further negotiation with them on the subject"
(Stephen, draft instructions, Colonial Office Papers, co 2°914,239, cited
in Ward 1974, 42). But Britain had formally recognized New Zealand as a
sovereign and independent state, "so far atleast as it is possible to make
that acknowledgment in favour of a people composed of numerous dis-
persed and petty tribes who possess few political relations to each other
and are incompetent to act, or even deliberate, in concert" (Lord Norman-
by's Instructions to Hobson, 14 Aug 1839, cited in Orange 1987, 30). For
this reason, a policy of frank and open dealing required that Britain nego-
tiate with the chiefs for the cession of sovereignty. But Hobson was pro-
vided with no draft treaty and was authorized to take possession of the
South Island by right of discovery.
If this aspect of treaty making was regarded rather lightly by the British,
control of the land trade was not. In NSW, Governor Gipps was concerned
to end the upsurge of speculation in Maori land. On his arrival in Sydney
in December 1839, Hobson, who had been provided with a draft procla-
mation regarding land, discussed the matter with him. On 18 January,
while Hobson was still crossing the Tasman Sea, Gipps issued a proclama-
tion to the effect that all pre-184° land claims would be subject to investi-
gation by a Land Claims Commission and future purchases would be by
the Crown only. A similar proclamation was made by Hobson (already
commissioned as lieutenant governor as well as consul) on his arrival at
the Bay of Islands. The Crown's preemptive right of purchase was to
become a feature of the treaty, only then drawn up.
4DiI:C lCI4UUUBctJJ:lIiOUUfJlilJJCJi
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The drafting process and the differing versions in English and Maori
(neither a precise translation of the other) have been the subject of close
analysis in recent New Zealand historiography: the differing understand-
ings of the British and the Maori both reflect and fuel the controversy that
has raged from the outset and rages today. (See Orange 1987, 32-59; Ross
1972; McKenzie, 1985. Maori and English texts of the treaty are printed as
appendix 2 in Orange 1987.)
By Article I of the English version, "The Chiefs of the Confederation of
the United Tribes of New Zealand, and the separate and independent
Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation" ceded to the
Queen of England "all the rights and powers of Sovereignty" that the
"Confederation or the Individual Chiefs" exercised over their "respective
Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof." This sort of formulation, and its
near equivalent in Maori, together with the collection of signatures of
chiefs throughout the land over the next five months, suggests that the
British saw the compact as one with the many distinct groups or even indi-
viduals, rather than with "the Maori people" as a collectivity. This makes
some'\Vha.~ PIobkm.atictbe mQcl~J:"~ t~nd~ncYI~refe!:~o .tl1e!viao!.i iIltl1e _
singular as "the treaty partner" with the British Crown, a formulation that -I'
underlies the modern Maori demand for coequal power with the Pakeha.
Given the very tenuous nature of the confederation, the New Zealand
government of today can reasonably draw at least as much support from
the treaty documents for its current policy of devolving responsibility to
the many tribal authorities as can the proponents of a single Maori
"nation."
More serious though is the controversy over key terms in the Maori-
language version of the treaty. The neologism kawanatanga, from the
transliteration of "governor" (kawana), was used to equate to the "sover-
eignty" that the Maori ceded in the English version. It could scarcely have
conveyed to the chiefs the full implications of "sovereignty." It may in part
have been selected by the missionary translator Henry Williams and the
British officials, instead of mana or rangatiratanga (the term used in the
1835 Declaration of Independence), words that more correctly denoted
chiefly authority, to win Maori acquiescence in the treaty. Indeed, no chief
(rangatira) would have wittingly signed away his mana or rangatiratanga.
However, Article 2, in the English version, confirmed the chiefs and tribes
and "the respective families and individuals thereof" in "the full exclusive
and undisturbed, possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries
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and other properties" so long as they wished to retain them; the Maori
version of this clause confirmed the chiefs and people in the tino rangatira-
tanga of their lands and taonga 'valued possessions'.
It is certain that the chiefs did not, at the time, fully apprehend the
extent of the authority that the new government would eventually exert
over them and would not have signed if they had. Orange has correctly
pointed out that the missionaries and officials urged upon them the posi-
tive aspects of government, not its negative or restrictive aspects. Yet,
though their presentation was scarcely impartial or farseeing, the British
at Waitangi were probably not deliberately devious. They had no wish to
diminish the authority (mana) of the chiefs over their own families and
tribes; the missionaries hoped rather to exert an influence through them as
they embraced Christianity and accepted missionary tutelage. Moreover,
convinced that the Maori had no traditional allegiance to any larger polity
than their local chiefs and tribe, the British authorities considered it
entirely appropriate to coin the new word kawanatanga for the new thing,
national sovereignty, while remaining perfectly content to recognize local
_chi~fly authority Ssee t~~ opJnion of Sir William Martin, New Zealand's
first attorney general, cited in Ward 1988, 172).
Be that as it may, it is clear from their statements (eg, "the shadow of
the land goes to the Queen, the substance remains with us") that the chiefs
in 1840 understood the guarantee of their tino rangatiratanga to be a
treaty recognition of their "full chieftainship" and their acceptance of Brit-
ish kawanatanga as a kind of overarching authority, intended mainly to
protect their chieftainships and their lands (Ward 1974, 42-44). By Article
3 of the treaty, the Queen extended to the Maori the rights and (in some
translations, the duties) of British subjects and promised them her protec-
tion (Kawharu, cited in NZ Maori Council v A-G 1987, 32-33).
THE TREATY 1840-1975
How little the treaty making meant to the question of national sover-
eignty, in British eyes, was demonstrated by the fact that on 21 May, with-
out waiting for the interior and southern chiefs' consent to the treaty,
Hobson declared British sovereignty over New Zealand, in respect of the
North Island by cession, the South Island and Stewart Island by right of
discovery. In fact, because a Erench warship had arrived to escort a small
colony of French settlers to Akaroa on Banks Peninsula, Hobson also sent
-
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a warship south to land a magistrate at that harbor. The basis in interna-
tionallaw by which New Zealand became British has been debated exten-
sively, but the weight of legal opinion is that it was by settlement and act
of state, rather than by cession in the treaty (McNeil I989, I32, I84).
Maori leaders, however, made very clear from the beginning the limits
to their acceptance of government authority. Certainly they cooperated
with officials to a considerable extent in the regulation of crime involving
members of both races. They also attended the Land Claims Commission
and appeared to appreciate its efforts to see that only equitable pre-I840
land purchases were approved. The requirement that the New Zealand
Company virtually renegotiate its shoddy land purchases in Cook Strait
was a very real protection of the Maori, and company officials railed
against the treaty, which they had assumed to be but "a temporary device
to amuse and pacify savages." Yet the chiefs too were resentful of increas-
ing restriction, such as new customs duties, collected by the government
not themselves, and controls on the cutting of increasingly precious kauri
timber. The Crown's preemptive right to purchase land, though protec-
tive, appar~mly _deniedJ:he M<iori_ the _9PPQrtuIliryw a<:c~pt thehigher
prices that private traders tantalized them with. As far as matters internal
to Maori communities were concerned, the officials had limited involve-
ment, although some Maori leaders allowed them to mediate and mini-
mize violeI1ce.
By I844 resentment of government authority led the volatile Hone
Heke, the first to sign the treaty, to begin open defiance, including his suc-
cessive assaults on the symbol of British sovereignty, the flagstaff at Rus-
sell (formerly Kororareka). Most chiefs stood aside from Heke's rising,
but there was widespread sympathy for him, especially in central North
Island.
The advent of a new governor, George Grey, in I845, and a new secre-
tary of state for colonies, Earl Grey, saw the Crown's treaty undertakings
even more severely tested. Earl Grey, sympathetic to the New Zealand
Company, provided a constitution in I846 in which "waste," that is,
uncultivated land, was to be registered as Crown land. The treaty prom-
ises regarding lands, forests, and fisheries were invoked by the mission-
aries and officials in New Zealand to defeat this proposal. After some vac-
illation, the Colonial Office took the view, and held to it, that the Maori
customarydaimto hunting andgath€ring rights inland (though not y€t in
tidal fisheries) was recognized (Adams I977, 2°4-2°9). This undoubtedly
kept the peace in New Zealand for another thirteen years.
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Moreover, in the most important legal interpretation of the period,
Regina v Symonds (1847), Chief Justice Martin and Justice Chapman also
supported Maori customary rights, as recognized in the treaty, but also as
recognized by two hundred years of British law applied in North America
and elsewhere (McHugh 1987, 242-243).
Though the Maori were thus enabled to continue to cooperate with
government, other aspects of Grey's administration made them feel that
their rangatiratanga was far from secure. Grey ceased negotiating with,
and treacherously seized, the mighty Te Rauparaha, who threatened the
company settlements in Cook Strait; Grey also abolished the Protectorate
Department, whose efforts had been crucial to the involvement of Maori
in government and respect for their points of view; he pursued an aggres-
sive land purchase policy that saw most of the South Island acquired with
little regard for the repeated instructions and undertakings to make
"ample reserves" for the Maori. The decisive move toward settler self-gov-
ernment in the 1852 constitution (which left the Maori unfranchised) was
further cause for alarm.
In tbis context, Maori leaders began to discuss various proposals for
their own supratribal authority. Under the skillful leadership of Wiremu
Tamihana Te Waharoa of Waikato, these resulted in 1858 in the selection
of the high chief Te Wherowhero as the first Maori King.
The goals and symbols of the King movement are extremely significant
in relation to recent Maori objectives. The moderate leaders like Tami-
hana envisaged a coequal relationship between the Queen and the Maori
King, in which rangatiratanga and mana motuhake (self-determination)
would be preserved alongside the Queen's mana and the law of God
(Orange 1987, 142-143). With Tamihana and his kind, it might just have
been possible to have negotiated some kind of semiautonomous Maori
province in the Waikato district, under section 71 of the 1857 constitution,
which provided for the declaration of "Native Districts" where British law
would not fully run. But Tamihana himself sought to extend the King's
mana throughout the land to restrain land selling; other King supporters,
in a clear assertion of ethnic nationalism, believed that Maori anywhere,
even in Auckland, should be able to claim their nationality and the juris-
diction of the King's law. In two or three cases, the King's police or sol-
diers even physically enforced this claim.
To the governor and the settlers, this was tantamount to treason or
rebellion. Even the moderate settlers and the Anglican clergy saw the
movement as threatening their fundamental "one people" view of the
__W--=tim¥@W 'M' ., miibt2ilUaa
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treaty. More directly, the King movement threatened to prevent further
land selling.
For these reasons, the government reacted very aggressively. In I860,
Governor Browne, on the advice of Native Secretary Donald McLean,
attacked the leading rangatira Wiremu Kingi over the Waitara block in
Taranaki, asserting, wrongly, that the chief was the agent of a Kingite
"Land League" rather than a senior chief defending his tribal patrimony.
In I863, after a tenuous truce in Taranaki, George Grey, returned for a
second governorship, invaded the Waikato district to suppress the King
movement, which was seen as the root of rebellion.
In the ten-year war that followed, the British forces, involving some ten
thousand troops and settler militia, plus Maori auxiliaries, achieved a lim-
ited victory, with the Maori capacity to resist government authority
severely eroded. The settlers consolidated their supremacy through legis-
lation in the parliaments of I862-I867-legislation that, in the settlers'
interpretation, gave effect in domestic law to provisions of the treaty. The
Native Land Acts of I862 and I86S recognized Maori customary title and
set up a Native Land Court (with Maori assessors) to decide contested
claims.SuccessfulcIaimants wereawarcled Crown grants that replaced
customary titles. A Native Rights Act of I86S confirmed that Maori were
British subjects able to sue and be sued in the Supreme Court-and to be
charged with treason if they took up arms, instead of being treated as for-
eign belligerents. A Native Schools Act of I867 laid the basis for primary
schools, teaching in English, in every major Maori village. A Maori Rep-
resentation Act, I867, enfranchised all adult Maori males and gave them
four seats in parliament. The Resident Magistrates Act of I867 continued
existing provisions whereby Maori chiefs, as salaried assessors, helped the
itinerant resident magistrates administer the law in rural districts-
although the act also made clear that it was British law that was being
applied, with only temporary modification to take account of Maori cus-
tom (Ward I974, 200-223). Many chiefs who had been neutral or assisted
the Queen's forces in the war, and even some former "rebels," thought that
these arrangements offered a reasonable guarantee of their rangatiratanga
and cooperated with the restoration of civil administration in their areas.
Goodwill was destroyed, however, by the vicious effect of the Native
Land Acts, which converted the complex of customary rights into highly
negotiable tides that Pakeha agentscosseted, cajoled, and bribed for over
the next half-century, setting Maori against Maori, and remorselessly
£ '4unm::ZU6it? M@,MKWdiiiiliWdliiWJ ,.
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relieving the North Island Maori of most of their land. This, more than
war and confiscation, was the destruction of Maori rangatiratanga (Ward
I974,224-263)·
In Pakeha law, appeals to the treaty no longer availed the Maori; in a
now notorious decision of I877, Chief Judge Prendergast ruled that inso-
far as the treaty "purported to cede the sovereignty of New Zealand it
must be regarded as a simple nullity for no body politic existed capable of
making a cession of sovereignty" (Wi Parata v the Bishop of Wellington,
cited in McHugh I987, 268-269). Therefore, unless given express recogni-
tion as domestic law, treaty provisions were of no effect.
Most Pakeha New Zealanders thus regarded the matter as settled and
took little notice of the treaty for one hundred years. They got on with
developing the land, and many had little contact at all with Maori. Oth-
ers, who associated with Maori at school, in sports teams, at work, and in
the armed forces of two world wars, were not unjustifiably proud of New
Zealand's racial integration and saw few major problems save the lack of
improvement in Maori health and educational attainments.
Not so the Maori. In a recent book of the greatest significance to New
Zealand's national debate, Claudia Orange has shown how the treaty, the
circumstances of its making, and its terms, especially in the Maori ver-
sion, have been a continuing focus of Maori aspirations for greater status
and advancement in the land of their birth. Heke's rising in I844 had been
accompanied by renewed references to the flag of I834 and the I835 decla-
ration of independence. The King movement, though inclined to see the
treaty as a Ngapuhi tribe affair, also flew the I834 flag, and some of its
leaders, like Tamihana, were willing to view the treaty as a possible basis
of coequal Maori and settler status (Orange I987, 143, I57). In I860, Gov-
ernor Browne and Donald McLean convened a great conference of chiefs
at Kohimarama in Auckland and expounded the treaty to them afresh.
But whereas the government saw the treaty as supporting their stand
against Wiremu Kingi in Taranaki and the King movement in Waikato,
the chiefs saw it as the confirmation of their mana, still to be enjoyed
under the protecting authority of the Queen. They were by no means con-
----vinced-of-the-rightness-of-the-government'$-actions-in-'Faranaki,though,-----
they generally stood aloof from the King movement (Orange I987, I49).
In the I870S, many who had cooperated with the resident magistrates
or founded schools or participated in elections for the four Maori seats,
became disillusioned as the sleazy land buying of government and private
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agents wrecked their efforts at farming and dislocated their society.
Diverse organizations, such as the Repudiation Movement in Hawke Bay,
the treaty movement among the Ngapuhi people, and a series of "parlia-
ments" convened by the Ngati Whatua tribe at Orakei in Auckland, all
debated the treaty and focused on the recognition of rangatiratanga in the
Maori-language version. The various movements combined in the I880s
and I890S in a Kotahitanga, or unity movement, seeking a separate Maori
parliament to govern the Maori and an end to the Native Land Court. The
King movement cooperated too in the drive for a mana motuhake, a quest
for self-determination through implementation of the treaty. A succession
of emissaries went to London to demand this of the British Crown (Ward
I974, 264-275; Orange I987, I85-204).
When these requests were rebuffed by both the British and the New
Zealand governments, the Kotahitanga was prone to accept an alternative
strategy, urged by Maori university graduates of the Young Maori Party,
led by Apirana Ngata. Ngata urged a cessation of efforts to contest the
question of sovereignty and acceptance of the national parliament and the
legal-administrative framework. This strategy appeared successful when
Ngata and his senior colleague James Carroll (a member of the Liberal
government) secured legislation to reform the worst features of the Land
Court and extend to local Maori committees power to regulate matters
relating to health, hygiene, and consumption of alcohol (Williams I969).
During the I920S, Ngata's good relations with Prime Minister Gordon
Coates saw the beginning of state funding for Maori land development
and the setting up of commissions of inquiry into such matters as confisca-
tion of land in Taranaki and Waikato and the inequitable purchases in the
South Island. The Sim Commission of I927 and the government of the day
accepted responsibility, though the level of compensation was low (But-
terworth I972).
Ngata's strategy, though of real and lasting benefit, came only slowly to
the thousands of Maori subsisting in poverty and poor health in scores of
rural slums, still largely adhering to a worldview based on traditional spir-
itual forces. These Maori still turned to politico-religious movements such
----:as-the-Pai-Marire-and-rhe-lhngatu-(-BinneY-I979,:fY-<t5-)-and,m0s-t-widel-y~---~
supported of all, the movement launched by Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana
in the I920S. The Ratana movement, a visionary and healing movement at
the outset, soon turned to the practical matters of economics and politics.
Ratana and his lieutenants (who began to contest and win the Maori seats
= l&ZiL
WARD. INTERPRETING THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 97
in parliament) called for the treaty to be given statutory authority and col-
lected thirty thousand signatures on a petition to that effect (Orange 1987,
233). The emergent Labour Party, which took office in 1935 and held it till
1949, formed an alliance with the Ratana movement, which was thus able
to carry its demand into the Labour caucus. The Maori people's magnifi-
cent effort and very heavy casualties in World War II, plus Labour's
dependence on the Maori members for its majority after 1946, saw more
substantial payments made for urgent land confiscations and South Island
land claims. The Maori people also benefited from Labour's welfare, edu-
cation, employment, and housing programs for all New Zealand's needy
citizens. But the government was not prone to do more as regards the
treaty; on the contrary, it was still capable, on utilitarian grounds, of the
most ruthless land acquisitions, including that of the remnants of Maori
land at historic Orakei, Auckland.
Nevertheless, the boom years of the 1950S witnessed Maori urbaniza-
tion and, at first, increasing prosperity. A major survey and a report by
Mr J. K. Hunn (1960) concluded that New Zealand's racial "amalgama-
tion" or "integration" was almost complete; the Hunn Report looked to
more effort in education and housing but a winding up of the legislation
for discrimination, including positive discrimination. However, the loss of
their culture, language, land, and identity was unacceptable to the Maori
people at large-all the more so because the urban Maori were largely
unskilled or semiskilled and most at risk as the boom ended and unem-
ployment rose. Notwithstanding their advancement in white-collar
employment and the professions, the burgeoning Maori population, with
a birth rate three times that of the Pakeha, were increasingly aware that
they were on the margins of a white-dominated, urban-industrial econ-
omy. Thus it was that just as Pakeha New Zealand was congratulating
itself on harmonious racial integration, Maori protest was about to burst
forth anew.
If the Hunn Report lit a slow fuse, a 1967 act compulsorily amalgamat-
ing or extinguishing fragmented and minuscule interests in Maori land
affronted traditional values and fueled the explosion of protest that fol-
--lowea-:-Young uroan Maori tormea new groups to loooy, marcn, ana pro-
test in now familiar ways. Maori formed links with black decolonization
movements abroad. The annual Waitangi Day ceremonies began to be dis-
rupted.
Once again calls arose from the most serious and responsible Maori
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organizations for a ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi, as the Maori
understood it, in the Maori-language version. Among these organizations
was the New Zealand Maori Council, mostly composed of successful
farmers and business people, created by a National Party government in
1962. Among them also was the prestigious and patiently toiling Maori
Women's Welfare League, headed by Mrs (now Dame) Whina Cooper.
In 1975 Whina Cooper led a vast Land March, from the far north to the
parliament in Wellington, to demand preservation in Maori title of
remaining Maori tribal land. The Labour Party was in office again from
1972 to 1975. In its last days and with the footsteps of the land marchers
ringing in its ears, it passed the Treaty ofWaitangi Act-an act drawn and
presented by Matiu Rata, the minister for Maori Affairs. Henceforth, any
Maori individuals or groups who considered themselves to be adversely
affected by an action of the Crown or its agencies could bring a claim
before a new tribunal, the Waitangi Tribunal, to seek recommendations
for redress.
THE TREATY SINCE 1975
The object of the 1975 act is "to provide for the observance and confirma-
tion of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi"; the Waitangi Tribunal,
chaired by the chief judge of the Maori Land Court, is to make recommen-
dations on claims relating to the practical -application of the principles of
the treaty. The tribunal can review and make recommendations on any
act, regulation, policy, or practice of the Crown that a Maori complainant
considers has injured his or her rights under the treaty. The tribunal can
also, on its own initiative, challenge any law it deems likely to breach the
treaty.
The National government did little to highlight the tribunal, and at first
few claims were brought to it. Instead, direct action intensified, with
occupations of former Orakei land at Bastion Point, Auckland, and of a
golf course in the town of Raglan, former Maori land taken for an airstrip
during the war and never returned. On Waitangi Day, demonstrations
-------nproduced-minorvi-olence-:-R-a-dical-A-ngli-can-cl-ergy-were-often-present-.------
From 1983, however, under a Maori chief judge, Edward Taihakurei
Durie, the Waitangi Tribunal began to develop the principles of the treaty
in relation to Maori customary rights in a claim objecting to pollution by
- &
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industrial discharges off a fishing reef at Motlmui, Taranaki (Waitangi
Tribunal 1983). The Motunui Report achieved wide support from Pakeha
concerned about the environment, and the Muldoon government acted on
it. Tribunal recommendations on pollution of a river at Kaituna and the
Manukau Harbour and on the status of the Maori language as a taonga
'valued thing', guaranteed in the treaty, had repercussions for all New
Zealanders (Orange 1987, 250). In such matters, the tribunal could not
easily separate developments before 1975 from those after it.
The decade of the Muldoon government's office, 1975-1984, saw New
Zealand deeply polarized over such matters as the massive police and mili-
tary dispersal of Bastion Point occupiers and the violence accompanying
the South African rugby tour of New Zealand in 1981. The intellectual
leadership of Maori protest became increasingly efficient and vocal and
included sons and daughters of some of the most "integrated" Maori in the
land. In 1984, Ms Donna Awatere presented a fundamental challenge to
the government in a book (which promptly sold out) claiming that Maori
sovereignty had been preserved by the Maori version of the treaty (Awa-
tere 1984). Social, racial, and civil rights issues thus assumed even greater
prominence than economics.
In this context, young urban Labour planners and relatively inexperi-
enced politicians somewhat blithely undertook in their February 1984 elec-
tion platform to extend the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal retro-
spectively to 1840. Second, they proposed a Bill of Rights that would
"incorporate the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi following full dis-
cussion with the Maori people about the best way in which this can be
brought about" (House of Representatives 1985, 36). There was close cor-
respondence between Labour's views and those of many Maori leaders. A
widely representative national hui (meeting) at the King movement's prin-
cipal marae, Turangawaewae, in September 1984, demanded a law to
require all legislation to be consistent with the treaty, and other major
meetings also sought a constitutional status for the treaty (ibid).
It was with confidence then that Geoffrey Palmer, attorney general in
the Labour government that took office in late 1984, secured in 1985 the
amendment-that-extended-the-tr-ibu-nal's-jur-isdi€tien-r-etl'espe€ti-vely-te-------
1840. Because the tribunal could review all actions of the Crown, includ-
ing acts of the legislature and actions done with the authority of colonial
law, the Labour government had, at one stroke, and rather more totally
- ==
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than it seems to have realized, opened the whole of New Zealand's colo-
nial history to scrutiny, on terms laid down by Maori. This was something
of an epistemological revolution if nothing else.
Palmer then circulated a White Paper and draft bill for a Bill of Rights,
which also sought to give effect to long-standing Maori viewpoints. The
preamble to the draft bill stated (among other things) that "it is desirable
to recognise and affirm the Treaty as part of the supreme law of New
Zealand."
Clause 4 stated: "(i) The rights of the Maori under the Treaty of
Waitangi are hereby recognised and affirmed. (ii) The Treaty of Waitangi
shall be regarded as always speaking and shall be applied to circumstances
as they arise so that effect may be given to its spirit and true intent." As in
the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the English and Maori versions were to be
regarded as of equal authority, but (according to an explanatory note)
"having regard to the historical circumstances, the Maori version may be
considered the primary one." In support, the White Paper quoted from the
tribunal's Motunui Report:
The Treaty was also more than an affirmation of existing rights. It was not
intended to merely fossilise a status quo, but to provide a direction for future
growth and development. The broad and general nature of its words indicates
that it was not intended as a finite contract but as the foundation for a develop-
ing social contract. (Waitangi Tribunal 1983, 61)
Article 4 would put paid in the future to views such as that of Prendergast
in the Wi Parata judgment:
This Bill will put it beyond challenge that, henceforth, not only is the Treaty of
Waitangi part of our law but that it has a superior status to general legislation.
The rights that it recognises will prevail over inconsistent legislation (existing
and future) by virtue of Article 1. (House of Representatives 1985, 75-76)
Elsewhere the White Paper stated:
If the Bill of Rights is enacted Governments, courts and Parliament will no
longer be able to claim that these rights are only moral rights and have no sub-
-----------,soft"'i'anncr.e.-tiin,law, or roar tney can De overrIooen, expressly or implieary;-l>y di-,-e--------,
ordinary process of legislation.
One consequence will be that under Article 23 all legislation must be inter-
preted as far as it can so as to make it consistent with the Treaty. But if it is
impossible to reconcile any particular legislation with the rights of the Maori
...... ow _Wil
-
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under the Treaty the legislation will under Article 1 be to that extent set aside
as being of no effect. This is subject only to the limits allowed in Article 3-
limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
(House of Representatives 1985, 37)
In the event, the Bill of Rights was not proceeded with as drafted. It was
widely opposed as unduly restrictive on the normal organic evolution of
statute law and precedent and likely to produce complex and costly litiga-
tion. Only a watered down version, without the treaty and without
entrenched clauses, was introduced to parliament in 1989 and immediately
opposed as worthless (cs, II Oct 1989). However, as a result of the White
Paper, the question of treaty rights was debated nationally and the prob-
lem of the precise nature of those rights brought into sharp focus. Maori
aspirations, including the claim to effective sovereignty through the pro-
posed guarantee of tino rangatiratanga, were greatly encouraged.
Meanwhile, a greatly enlarged Waitangi Tribunal had begun to receive
claims retrospective to 1840. To manage them all, dozens of small matters
were aggregated into somewhat fewer formally recorded claims, and these
Chief Judge Durie sought to deal with on a tribal basis. Some forty-six
claims relating to historic grievances had been formally registered by the
end of 1986, and the tribunal began to hear the enormous volume of evi-
dence and submissions collected in respect of Muriwhenua, the Northland
peninsula. This was, after all, the home region of the treaty; it was also
the stronghold of Matiu Rata, the founder of the Treaty of Waitangi Act,
who had resigned from the Labour Party over alleged tardiness in address-
ing Maori demands and founded a new party, significantly entitled Mana
Motuhake.
As the tribunal was working, the government was beginning the huge
task of privatization of New Zealand's substantial public sector-transfer-
ring its assets to a series of corporations such as the Coal Corporation of
New Zealand, the Forestry Corporation, and the Land Corporation.
Although the former minister of the relevant government department was
at first the sole shareholder, the corporations had a statutory requirement
to pursue profitability, and this could involve sale of assets or private sec-
------t":tOTTontrul-ohhem-rhrough-contracts-aHecting-interests-in-the--e0l'-p0r-a--------
tions. The 1985 Waitangi Act amendment had led to widespread expecta-
tions that the Maori would be compensated by very substantial transfers
of Crown lands, forests, and other assets, for the Crown owned some four
million hectares of land and forests plus many urban properties. Now the
.
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State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986 threatened to put these assets
beyond the disposition of the Crown. A spate of claims affecting Crown
lands and forests thus came to the tribunal, while the tribunal itself chal-
lenged the legislation as possibly being in breach of the treaty. Two
amendments were quickly drawn up and accepted by the government and
parliament with little debate. A fairly elaborate section 27 provided that
where claims had already been lodged over land affected by the State-
Owned Enterprises Act, the land would still be subject to such claims and
the government, by Orders-in-the-Council, could give effect to tribunal
recommendations regarding them. A general section 9 declared simply:
"Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi."
In early 1987, the New Zealand Maori Council brought a case to the
High Court and thence to the Court of Appeal for a ruling on the effect of
these amendments, particularly in relation to state forests being trans-
ferred to the Forestry Corporation. The court's judgment, in June 1987,
dramatically enhanced the authority of the treaty and the tribunal. Chief
Justice Robin Cooke and his colleagues concluded:
The wording of section 9 is plain and unqualified. In its ordinary and natural
sense the section has the impact of a constitutional guarantee within the field
covered by the State-Owned Enterprises Act.... What is now our responsi-
bility is to say clearly that the Act of Parliament restricts the Crown to acting
under it in accordance with the principles of the Treaty. It becomes the duty of
the Court to check, when called on to do so in any case that arises, whether
that restriction has been observed and, if not, to grant a remedy. Any other
answer to the question of interpretation would go close to treating the declara-
tion made by Parliament about the Treaty as a dead letter. That would be
unhappily and unacceptably reminiscent of an attitude, now past, that the
Treaty itself is of no true value to the Maori people. (NZ Maori Council v A-G
1987,21,28)
The judges then set about elucidating the principles of the treaty. They
used for guidance many of the statements in earlier decisions of the
Waitangi Tribunal. But whereas these previously had the standing only of
--------Ire€0m-memla-~i0ns,n0w__~hey-h-ad---the-f(')ree-(')f-judieiaI-precedent;-eooke------.
noted first that it was the principles of the treaty, not its actual words, that
were to be applied; moreover, it was well known that the English and
Maori versions did not necessarily convey the same meaning. The basic
terms of the bargain of 1840, said Cooke, were that
#i;hIWW,·IZiIllIW1JidIit.iZiL1lWlJiWmiii2L..!Ul6LIJIIitJ~mU2ll2ltlwt:aii SIt·
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the Queen was to govern and the Maori were to be her subjects; in return their
chieftainships and possessions were to be protected, but sales of land to the
Crown could be negotiated. These aims partly conflicted. The Treaty has to be
seen in embryo rather than a fully developed and integrated set of ideas. (NZ
Maori Council v A-G I987, 34-35)
The treaty signified a partnership between races, and each party thus had
a duty to act with the utmost reasonableness and good faith toward the
other.
The relationship between the Treaty partners creates responsibilities analo-
gous to fiduciary duties ... the duty of the Crown is not merely passive but
extends to active protection of Maori people in the use of their lands and
waters to the fullest extent practicable ... practicable means reasonably prac-
ticable ... the duty to act reasonably and in good faith is not one-sided. For
their part the Maori people have undertaken a duty of loyalty to the Queen,
full acceptance of her Government through her responsible Ministers, and rea-
sonable co-operation. (NZ Maori Council v A-G I987, 37)
A duty to grant redress was also accepted:
If the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress the
Crown should grant at least some form of redress. (NZ Maori Council v A-G
I987,37-38)
A duty on the Crown to protect Maori interests arose from Article 3 of the
treaty. However:
The principles of the Treaty do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on the
right of a duly elected Government to follow its chosen policy. Indeed to try to
shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be inconsistent with those
principles. The test of reasonableness is necessarily a broad one and necessarily
has to be applied by the Court in the end in a realistic way. (NZ Maori Council
v A-G I987, 40)
The court was pursuing a complex balance in all of this, and it was not
immediately apparent what the effect would be. Ministers and officials
.......... feared.thauhewhole-priy-atizationpoliqr.would.he-jeopardized,alLassets-
being subject to as yet undetermined claims. The Maori feared that the
fine words would amount to nothing very substantial.
Considerable reassurance was given to the Maori in a further amend-
ment to the State-Owned Enterprises Act in I988, whereby the Crown
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committed itself in general terms to giving effect to tribunal recommenda-
tions in respect of the transferred land, buying the land back if necessary.
This in effect enabled the transfers to go ahead. Yet the Tainui tribes of
Waikato district became concerned when the Crown began to transfer to
the Coal Corporation the huge assets of coal in the Waikato basin, the
very land confiscated after the wars of the 1860s and the subject of tribu-
nal claims by Tainui. To guard their interests, the Tainui Trust Board, led
by Mr Robert Mahuta, Waikato University academic and scion of the
main Kingitanga family, brought an action the point of which was largely
to determine that coal was an "interest in land" for the purposes of the
State-Owned Enterprises Act. The Court of Appeal found for the plain-
tiffs, and again ChiefJustice Cooke waxed eloquent.
The principles of the treaty as outlined in the Maori Council case are,
he said, "of limited scope and do not require a social revolution." They
have no effect on private titles lawfully shared, nor does partnership mean
that every asset has to be shared equally. Neither was it inconsistent with
the treaty for the Crown "to decline to be bound in advance to the precise
terms or extent of any Waitangi Tribunal recommendation." But the Sim
Commission of 1927 had acknowledged the injustice of the confiscation,
and the compensation given to Tainui then appeared trivial now. Direct
negotiations with the Crown had been proposed by Tainui, and Cooke
endorsed this "suggestion." Coal should not be excluded in advance from
the negotiation. "Token acknowledgments that the Treaty has been
honoured cannot be enough." Non-Maori had to adjust to the fact that
preparation had to be made for past and continuing breaches of the treaty.
On the Maori side it has to be understood that the Treaty gave the Queen gov-
ernment, Kawanatanga, and foresaw continued immigration. The develop-
ment of New Zealand as a nation has been largely due to that immigration
... the history and economy of the nation rule out extravagant claims in the
democracy now shared. (Mahuta and Tainui Trust Board v A-G 1989, 31-39)
The Court of Appeal has clearly set itself up as the watchdog and inter-
preter of the Treaty of Waitangi. By such a careful balance as Cooke has
outlined, it seeks~tO-steerthe country -thr:ough the mounting racial tension.
To the government, it seemed that Cooke was going too far and making
policy; nevertheless, it has accepted the "suggestion" to negotiate. Nine-
teen-ninety is an election year, and the outcome of the negotiation will
WARD. INTERPRETING THE TREATY OF WAITANGI lOS
have a considerable bearing on how the voting public of New Zealand
view the treaty and the processes that Labour has unfolded since 1985.
The relationship among the Waitangi Tribunal, the superior courts,
and the routine processes of government has also been revealed in relation
to fish. Whereas, after 1840, the Crown had recognized an ongoing Maori
customary right over land, it had generally considered that Maori retained
no customary right below the high-water mark of the sea, except in a few
explicitly recognized cases. However, the Muriwhenua (Northland) claim
to the tribunal focused on traditional fishing rights, so important to a
Polynesian people. The tribunal agreed with the claimants that these fish-
ing rights, explicitly mentioned in the English version of the treaty, had
never been properly extinguished or compensated; the Crown had failed
to protect either traditional Maori fishing or commercial fishing, which
had fallen into the hands of large and often overseas companies.
Meanwhile the Maori Council had again brought a case in the High
Court based on the recognition of traditional rights in common law, stat-
utes, and the treaty, specifically in respect of the virtual exclusion of
Maori from the fishing quotas, worth some NZ$SO million a year, defined
for the various species as part of the government's effort to balance com-
mercial fishing and conservation. This too had ended up in the Court of
Appeal, where the judges ordered the claimants and Crown to come to a
negotiated agreement. The Maori negotiators started from the position
that the whole of New Zealand's fisheries were still theirs, under the
treaty, but that they should share them fifty-fifty with the Crown. But the
government, implicitly rejecting much of what the claimants and the tri-
bunal had said, would concede no more than 10 percent of the fishing
quotas, to be transferred to a Maori Fisheries Commission at the rate of
2.S percent a year for four years. Half of this is to be developed for maxi-
mum economic return by the commission, half to go direct to Maori peo-
ple, having regard to local traditions and needs. The Maori Fisheries Act
1989 gives effect to this.
The Muriwhenua people, meanwhile, had sought a ruling from the
Court of Appeal that the tribunal's report should be binding on both par-
ties. This the court declined, Cooke reaffirming the view (which Chief
Judge Durie had asserted all along) that the tribunal had no power of
determination but was more in the nature of a commission of inquiry. He
deferred a High Court hearing on Muriwhenua's fishing claim, to await
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the tribunal's report on the Ngai Tahu tribal claim (which also concerned
traditional fishing rights) and the working out of the new Maori Fisheries
Act. The act, he said, was not a final settlement of the issue; it would need
to be renewed in a few years because the treaty was a "living instrument"
by which Maori rights could be constantly measured (NZH, 23-25 Feb, I
Mar I990).
This view of how the treaty is to be applied is also firmly held by Chief
Judge Durie, in contrast to the "final settlement" approach used in Canada
and the United States to settle Indian fishing claims (Durie I986, 236). In
New Zealand too the government had sought closure, or at least a long
moratorium, on Maori fishing claims; the Pakeha community generally is
prone to tolerate an expensive rectification of past Maori grievances only
if it really does put an end to them. The Maori have resisted this, believing
that any "settlement" can be quickly outmoded by economic and techno-
logical change, as were the Sim Commission's I927 recommendations.
Meanwhile, from October I987 to October I989, the tribunal had been
hearing the massive evidence on the Ngai Tahu claim, relating to griev-
ances arising out of the purchase of land for the Otago and Canterbury
settlements and later over the rest of the South Island. At time of writing,
the tribunal has not reported, but Maori allegations of unfulfilled prom-
ises to make ample reserves have been admitted by the Crown, and the
chairman of the tribunal hearing the claim has recommended that the
Crown not sell its surplus land in the South Island in case it is involved in
the eventual compensation (Press, II Oct I989).
The events of I985-I990 have appeared revolutionary to many white
New Zealanders. No longer is it a matter of localized environmental
issues. The greatly enhanced status of the treaty, the decisions of the
Court of Appeal, the involvement of the tribunal in the disposition of
national resources, particularly at a time of severe economic constraint,
have awakened strong feelings. To many, the tribunal seemed to be run-
ning amok and Maori demands to be extravagant. But to other whites, the
justice of many Maori claims was self-evident, as was the need to develop
a strategy to meet the huge and growing problem of an uprooted, urban
Maori population, underemployed, undereducated, and crime prone.
Direct action by aggrieved Maori could not be ruled out; indeed, occupa-
tions of property have occurred in several more instances, not always end-
ing without minor violence and police intervention.
The principal strategy to meet Maori needs is to abolish, by I995, the
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cumbersome and paternalistic Department of Maori Affairs and transfer
its budget and development funds to Maori tribal authorities-the Iwi
Authorities, now in the process of being set up under legislation of 1989. If
the hearing of historic or current grievances by the tribunal, accompanied
by direct negotiation by tribal groups with the Crown, results in a further
controlled and constructive transfer of resources as in the fisheries agree-
ment, many New Zealanders would see this as a useful process. The
Opposition National Party seems also to accept it in principle; the shadow
minister for Maori Affairs, a Maori, Mr Winston Peters, who gained
enormous popularity among the Pakeha electorate for his early criticisms
of the tribunal, has now muted them. The clearer definition of the role of
the tribunal by the Court of Appeal will ease the apprehensions of many
Pakeha. Maori claims to the tribunal have also fallen off since the flurry
occasioned by the State-Owned Enterprises Act; the current director, Mr
Buddy Mikaere, is not anticipating more than ten in 1990 (NZH, 20 Feb
1990). However, indications that a National government might legislate to
debar further claims would precipitate a spate of claims before the elec-
tions, due in October 1990.
Mr Geoffrey Palmer, who succeeded Mr David Lange as Prime Minister
in 1989, recently reaffirmed the government's intention to press ahead
with the tackling of unresolved grievances and to negotiate settlements
that see more Maori "in jobs not in jail." He cited the statistics of claims
before the tribunal as of November 1989: 16 heard and reported, 10 heard
with reports in preparation, 3 in process of mediation, 21 being researched
for hearing, and 52 awaiting initial appraisal. The task would take time,
but was not indefinite. A new ministerial task force would direct the han-
dling of treaty issues. "The process is slow and not without pain," he said.
Its results "will not be nearly as dramatic as some Maoris expect nor as
some non-Maoris fear." And in an implied rebuke to Chief Justice Cooke,
Mr Palmer added, the process depends on the correct balance between
parliament, the executive, and the courts:
There has arisen in New Zealand a feeling that somehow all the fundamental
decisions about how the Treaty of Waitangi will be honoured will be made by
the courts. This is not the case ... the courts interpret the law, they do not
legislate, they do not govern. The Executive governs. (NZH, 2Jan 1990)
These remarks were clearly intended to appeal to the Pakeha electorate
in an election year. But the determined assertion that the government is in
108 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING 1991
control, reassuring to the Pakeha, runs the risk of confirming Maori suspi-
cions that their seeming guarantees under the treaty and recent law are
precarious and that Pakeha governments will succumb again to white self-
interest and prejudice.
This is the context of the highly significant speeches at Waitangi before
Elizabeth II on 6 February 1990. On the one hand, Sir Graham Latimer,
chairman of the New Zealand Maori Council, could affirm cheerfully that
it was an occasion for celebration because New Zealand had had the cour-
age to tackle its problems and that Maori people had access to machinery
for redress of grievances-the tribunal, the courts, and parliament. By
contrast, Bishop Vercoe voiced the protesters' demand for something
much more far-reaching:
You have marginalised us ... what we are trying to establish is that my tina
rangatiratanga is the same as your tino rangatiratanga ... I want to say to the
Government: don't produce principles of the Treaty-the Treaty is already
there. (NZH, 7 Feb 1990)
This is going back to the understanding of the chiefs when they signed
in 1840-a demand for at least coequal status with the Pakeha. The care- .
ful nuancing of Maori and English versions by the legislature and the
Court of Appeal seem to give something less, in the bishop's view. Similar
views have been expounded in a recent book, A Question of Honour:
Labour and the Treaty, I984-I989, by the Auckland law lecturer Jane Kel-
sey (1990). Whereas the New Zealand Maori Council's draft revision of
the Maori Affairs Act accepts "the exchange of sovereignty for the protec-
tion of rangatiratanga" and defines rangatiratanga as "the custody and
care of matters significant to the cultural identity of the Maori people in
trust for future generations" (New Zealand Maori Council 1983), Ms Kel-
sey .defines it as "the absolute authority of the Maori people collectively
over their lives and resources." Kawanatanga, which the chiefs ceded, is
seen in her view as operating within limits determined by the chiefs. This
was the 1840 Maori understanding as expressed in Nopena Panakareao's
words "the shadow of the land goes to the Queen, the substance remains
with us." In those terms, the Maori have the right to political and eco-
nomic autonomy under the treaty, and Labour's policies and even the
vaunted decisions of the Court of Appeal fall far short of that. Distribu-
tion of economic and political power is the crux of the matter for Kelsey
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(as it was for Donna Awatere before her). Her book, reflecting considera-
ble Maori opinion, is a claim to effective sovereignty, at least at the local
level. As Orange has shown, this has been demanded by successive Maori
organizations since 1840, and it has found renewed expression in recent
demands for separate Maori judicial institutions and young Maori refus-
ing to accept the jurisdiction of the regular courts (a move denounced by
the veteran Dame Whina Cooper) (NZH, 8 Mar 1990). Other leaders seek
the return of tribal land on which to recreate locally sovereign Maori com-
munities (Hohepa 1990).
More in line with Maori Council views is a book by Mr Hiwi Tauroa,
former race relations conciliator under the 1971 Race Relations Act, called
Healing the Breach (1990). Mr Tauroa earlier achieved celebrity by pub-
licly arguing for the abolition of the special Maori seats in favor of full
Maori participation in the general electorates. Like Ngata before him,
Tauroa now urges rectification of grievances within the existing frame-
work. He urges real inclusion of Maori within the state institutions, not
division of state power on racial lines as Kelsey urges. 1
In the political arena, Mr Matiu Rata of the Mana Motuhake Party has
sought to steer a course in dangerous matters by proposing eight Maori
"provincial governments" with defined powers subject to the overall sov-
ereignty of the New Zealand parliament. These elected regional bodies, he
said, would have more appeal to young Maori than would the Runanga
Iwi (tribal councils) being developed by the government in concert with
the New Zealand Maori Council (NZH, 10 Apr 1990).
CONCLUSION
The racial situation in New Zealand in the election year 1990 is very sensi-
tively poised. The most senior Maori spokespeople in the land have voiced
warnings. The governor-general, the Most Reverend Sir Paul Reeves, for-
mer Anglican Archbishop of New Zealand, has urged the legislators to
defy the inevitable white backlash and push ahead with relieving Maori
people of the sense of injustice. "If we don't take the justice option," he
said, "we run the risk of reaping the whirlwind." Mr Matiu Rata and Mr
Robert Mahuta have also warned of possible violence if the thousands of
young Maori "have-nots" are allowed to brood on their situation ("Four
Corners" 1990). Dame Mira Szaszy, successor to Dame Whina Cooper as
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head of the Maori Women's Welfare League, has continued to press for a
constitutional status for the treaty, otherwise she fears that Maori claims
will be attended to only piecemeal (NZL, 5 Feb 199°,5).
Mr Palmer and Mr Lange have implicitly rejected the demands of
Bishop Vercoe and Dame Mira. The prime minister said that the primary
problem with the treaty was its vagueness. Its principles do need to be elu-
cidated, and its "operational consequences" are far from clear (NZH, 7
Mar 1990). For his part, Mr Lange rejected the treaty as sufficient in itself
to constitute the basis of a solemn compact. "Did Queen Victoria for a
moment think of forming a partnership with a number of signatures, a
number of thumb prints and 500 people?" he asked. This was echoing, in
unfortunately sarcastic language, the 1839 view of the Colonial Office
about the capacity of a tribal people to exercise or transfer national sover-
eignty. Mr Lange also said, "It [the treaty] can become the Magna Carta of
New Zealand but it is not going to become that from Dead Sea scroll
eschatology examination"-'-a reference presumably to radical efforts to
make claims for power based on the Maori text and the term tina
rangatiratanga (NZH, 7 Mar 1990).
For the Labour leaders, therefore, sovereignty is not at issue. They have
even moved a long way from their promotion of a constitutional status for
the treaty in the draft Bill of Rights in 1985. But they hold to the view
(since elaborated by Chief Justice Cooke) that the treaty is an agreement in
embryo, a living document the meaning of which will be unfolded by the
two peoples in democratic partnership.
The New Zealand public are not altogether wrong in concluding that
the Labour government in 1984-1985 was naive and careless in encourag-
ing Maori expectations that it and the nation are not prepared to accom-
modate. Nevertheless, the government has also courageously set out to
deal with the historic bases of division between Maori and Pakeha, long
and sometimes bitterly nursed by the Maori and too often cloaked by
Pakeha self-satisfaction. The government will no doubt push ahead with
"the justice option" and seek to negotiate major settlements with Tainui
and Ngai Tahu before the election.
For its part, the National Party has shown an inclination to review pro-
ceedings under the Waitangi Tribunal, turning it into a body to research
Maori needs and grievances at the government's direction but not to make
recommendations. Mr Winston Peters, National's spokesman on Maori
affairs, has also stated that a National government would stop the courts
we w-
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from using the treaty partnership "myth" as a basis for legal decisions
(NZH, 7 May 1990). Whether the majority of Maori will accept such a
course as sufficient remains to be seen. If a substantial proportion do not,
New Zealand's social order must be in serious peril. For it is certain that
the Pakeha majority (and other immigrant groups such as the one hundred
thousand Pacific Islanders) will not concede now, any more than they did
in 1863, that sovereignty is at issue or that the national institutions should
be fundamentally divided. Nor will the Maori demographic upsurge lead
to a majority or near-majority Maori population as has sometimes been
asserted. But the 1990 election will be emotionally charged with respect to
the racial question, and every statement by leaders and opinion-makers of
either race will be very important. The sesquicentennial of the Treaty of
Waitangi may be the year when New Zealand turns its most dangerous
corner since the Anglo-Maori wars or when, through a failure of either
race to understand and come to terms with the other, the seeds of conflict
are sown for the next generation.
Note
I Other 1990 publications are Richard Mulgan, Maori, Pakeha and Democ-
racy, Oxford University Press; Peter Cleave, The Sovereignty Game, Institute of
Policy Studies, Victoria University Press; and Andrew Sharp, Justice and the
Maori, Oxford University Press.
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